Production began in mid-1936, and it quickly became apparent that its off-road capabilities left much to be desired: The H35 was poorly balanced and had quite bumpy handling, which could be dangerous in formation, especially if they fired while driving. The power-to-weight ratio was also inadequate.
During the May-June 1940 campaign, the H35 and the improved H39 were used in dispersed formations and rarely had a clear superiority over the enemy.
The lack of radio and communication with headquarters and the overworked tank commander (he had to load the gun, aim, fire, signal and give instructions to the driver at the same time) also led to disastrous results.
Source: https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/fran ... h35_39.php
Apart from its shortcomings, the H35 suffered the same fate as the other French tank models: Ineffective deployment due to massive errors in strategy and tactics in an overly defensive doctrine. Here is just one example of a situation on the Meuse near Sedan:
On May 14, 1940, the reinforced XXI Army Corps (Flavigny) was to press in a German bridgehead. Flavigny's more than 300 tanks were opposed by only 30 German tanks and weak infantry forces at the time of the ordered attack. However, General Jean Flavigny was so impressed by descriptions of the positions of previously defeated corps reserves that he spread his forces out to a width of 20 km and ordered them to defend. After reporting this and receiving another order in the night of May 15 to attack immediately, he spent the whole of May 15 trying in vain to regroup his scattered forces (the French tanks were not equipped with radio as standard). The attack did not take place.
Source: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westfeldzug
